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Late-Stage Textualism
2022 Sup. Ct. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2022)
Ryan D. Doerfler*
I. Introduction
Are “canons of construction” embarrassing?1 For a long time, the answer was ‘yes.’
Exposed as “contradictory” by Karl Llewellyn, a generation of legal thinkers understood
interpretive canons to be so malleable in their application as to operate mostly as pretext.2
Rather than bring predictability to statutory cases, the availability of more than one
interpretive canon in any given case meant that a canon’s invocation worked mostly to
obscure the choice (conscious or no) by judges between legally permissible outcomes.
Interpretive canons were thus tools of legal mystification, providing the appearance of law
to what were, ultimately, acts of discretion.
This sort of skepticism about interpretive canons persisted at least until the
“textualist revolution” of the late 1980s and early 1990s.3 Partly a successful political
project by elite conservative lawyers and elected officials, the elevation of a text-centric
approach to statutory interpretation within the federal judiciary created a receptive
environment for legal doctrines concerned mostly with sentence- and word-level
inference. At the same time, legal theorists within the textualist movement helped to
reconceive interpretive canons in ways that would insulate them from earlier critiques. In
particular, these “modern” textualists incorporated insights from philosophers of language
and linguists concerning language’s practical character and, correspondingly, the
sensitivity of language to interpretive context.4 Viewed through this linguistic pragmatist
lens,5 interpretive canons were not to be thought of as “mechanical[]” rules of the sort
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1 LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 324 (John F. Manning & Matthew C. Stephenson, eds., 4th ed. 2021)
(describing “canons of construction” as “interpretive principles, or presumptions that judges use to discern—
or, at times, construct—statutory meaning”).
2 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How
Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 399 (1950).
3 Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (2006).
4 John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2392–93 (2003) (“Even the strictest
modern textualists properly emphasize that language is a social construct. They ask how a reasonable
person, conversant with the relevant social and linguistic conventions, would read the text in context.”).
5 Here and throughout the phrase “linguistic pragmatism” is used loosely to refer both to the broader idea
that linguistic meaning depends upon social practice and, more narrowly, that linguistic utterances
sometimes communicate content beyond what is said, strictly speaking. For skepticism that “pragmatics”
in the narrow sense has significant relevance to statutory interpretation, see Andrei Marmor, Can the Law
Imply More Than It Says? On Some Pragmatic Aspects of Strategic Speech, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames, eds., 2011).
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Llewellyn understandably ridiculed,6 but rather as broad generalizations about how
people use words, admitting of myriad exceptions.7
Coming to the present Term, the Supreme Court is now populated even more fully
by textualists following multiple appointments by Republicans during the Donald Trump
presidency. With all these appointments well-versed in the teachings of modern
textualism (and some contributing to those teachings through their own scholarly writing 8),
one would thus expect the use of interpretive canons in this Court to be flexible and
linguistically pragmatic. And yet, with great embarrassment, the opposite appears to be
true. In numerous cases this Term, the Court’s statutory analysis received derisive
commentary from scholars and journalists, having displayed the very sort of
“wooden[ness]” that textualism had been caricatured with by its opponents for so many
years.9 Such wooden interpretation was especially visible in the cases involving
interpretive canons, in which the Court pretended to the sort of precision and determinacy
that Llewellyn so effectively mocked.
So, what happened? As with the rise of textualism, the story has to do both with
legal theory and politics.
In terms of theory, modern textualism always contained within it an argumentative
tension. According to one line of reasoning, what distinguished modern textualism from
its “plain meaning” predecessors was, as mentioned, its incorporation of linguistic
pragmatism.10 In recognizing that the meaning of words depended greatly upon the
practical setting, modern textualists effectively abandoned the ideal (and caricature) of a
“mechanical” jurisprudence by opening themselves to circumstances in which the
meaning of a legal text would be reasonably contestable given the numerous
considerations that go into what language means as used.11 This sort of humility about
statutory determinacy paired naturally with earlier observations by Legal Realists,
including Llewellyn, concerning the limits of legal determinacy in the context of appellate
adjudication. It was thus by incorporating (to varying degrees) Realist insights as well that
textualism became thoroughly modern. This line of reasoning sat in tension, however,
6

Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1175 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
See, e.g., RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 646–47 (2012) (Scalia, J.)
(recognizing that canons are not “absolute rule[s],” but “merely ... strong indication[s] of statutory meaning
that can be overcome by textual indications that point in the other direction”); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
552 U.S. 214, 228 (2008) (Thomas, J.) (observing that “interpretive canons must yield ‘when the whole
context dictates a different conclusion’” (quoting Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 499
U.S. 117, 129 (1991)).
8 See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109 (2010); Brett
M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation Judging Statutes, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118 (2016).
9 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in
Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3,
23 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System].
10 John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 108 (2001) [hereinafter
Manning, Textualism and the Equity of Statute] (“Modern textualists, however, are not literalists.”); Molot,
supra note 3 at 2.
11 Mitchell N. Berman, Judge Posner's Simple Law, 113 MICH. L. REV. 777, 789 (2015).
7
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with continuing assurances by textualist judges and scholars that their method brought
“predictability” and so determinacy to statutory cases.12 In this way, modern textualists
did continue to promise, at least implicitly, something like a mechanical jurisprudence
despite its having explicitly been disavowed.
As this Essay explains, this tension between predictability and linguistic
pragmatism was mediated for decades by a further theoretical commitment among
modern textualists to judicial non-intervention. Insisting that the role of judges within our
constitutional democracy was to find law rather than make it, modern textualists
consistently if unevenly expressed support for the idea that judges should stay their hand
in one way or another in the absence of “clear[ly]” identifiable law.13 Practically speaking,
this meant declining to alter the legal status quo (for instance, rejecting a challenge to an
agency ruling or declining to impose criminal liability) or otherwise deferring to the policy
judgments of more politically accountable actors—so long as the statutory language at
issue was relevantly “ambiguous.”14 Manifested in different doctrinal rules, textualist
judges were thus at least sometimes able to resolve statutory cases without having to
identify a single “best” reading of the language at issue, which is to say without having to
act as if statutory language is more determinate than it is.15
Politically, conservatives were supportive of non-interventionist doctrines into the
early 2000s. Sometime around 2015, however, the Republican Party reversed its position
through official statements and, more consequentially, judicial appointments, celebrating
intervention instead. Most visibly through its selection of judicial nominees who rejected
the non-interventionist Chevron doctrine, conservative judges and justices, while still
avowed textualists, now argued that a judge’s failure to intervene in many cases would
be a violation of his or her constitutional duties. Functionally, this embrace of judicial
intervention worked to empower a now firmly conservative federal judiciary, seizing
discretion previously exercised by elected branch officials. As a matter of statutory
interpretation, it meant that these ‘late-stage’ textualist judges were left to act as if
statutory language admitted of only one plausible reading, with interpretive canons being
used once again as contradictory rules of the sort Llewellyn derided.
This Essay proceeds as follows. In Part II, it describes the fall and rise of
interpretive canons, moving from Llewellyn’s influential critique through modern
textualism’s reconceptualization and rehabilitation of canons. In Part III, this Essay
documents the embarrassing use of interpretive canons today, with special attention to
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See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS xxix
(2012) (“[T]extualism will provide greater certainty in the law, and hence greater predictability and greater
respect for the rule of law.”).
13 E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544-45 (1983) [hereinafter
Easterbook, Statutes’ Domains]; Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Judicial Deference] (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
14 Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, supra note 13, at 533; Scalia, Judicial Deference, supra note 13, at 511.
15 E.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005)
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this Term’s decision in Facebook v. Duguid.16 In Part IV, it describes the political and
theoretical developments that led to the embrace and then rejection by textualists of a
principle of non-intervention and how doing so first obscured and then heightened that
methodology’s basic tension. Finally, in Part V, this Essay shows how the rejection of
non-intervention has made statutory interpretation more wooden and more inviting of
ridicule even apart from interpretive canons, focusing specifically on two other cases from
this past Term, Niz-Chavez v. Garland17 and Van Buren v. United States.18

II. The Fall and Rise of Interpretive Canons
A. The Fall
Originally published in 1950, Llewellyn’s Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed is regarded
as one of the most causally significant pieces of scholarship in the history of the American
legal academy. Though best known for its table of “dueling canons,” Llewellyn’s critique
of interpretive canons was part of a broader effort to show that the norms of legal
argumentation reliably underdetermine legal outcomes in the context of appellate
litigation.19 Just as appeals to precedent were inadequate to decide common law
appellate disputes owing to the numerous ways in which past decisions can “correct[ly]”
be read, so too, Llewellyn tried to show, with statutory cases and invocations of
interpretive canons.20 Mostly because of Congress’s limited foresight, Llewellyn
explained, legislative bargains predictably fail to address, at least specifically, the full
range of practical circumstances to which statutes will eventually be applied. 21 For that
reason, it inevitably falls upon judges to make the best of a difficult circumstance,
“quarr[ying]” sense out of the statute “in light of the new situation” in an admittedly
“creative” and, ultimately, pragmatic endeavor.22
In offering his remarks, Llewellyn was careful not to fault judges for engaging in
such artistic behavior. With common law decisions, for example, Llewellyn insisted that it
was “silly” to think of judges’ using the available “leeway as involving ‘twisting’ of
precedent.”23 To characterize judicial behavior that way, after all, “presupposes that there
was in the precedent under consideration some one and single meaning,” a
presupposition the “whole experience of our case-law” shows to be “false.”24 Similarly,
given the unavoidable under-specification of legislative bargains, as well as, in Llewellyn’s
16

141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021).
141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021).
18 141 S. Ct. 1648 (2021).
19 Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 399.
20 Id. at 395.
21 Id. at 400 (“[I]ncreasingly as a statute gains in age … its language is called upon to deal with
circumstances utterly uncontemplated at the time of its passage.”).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 399.
24 Id.
17
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view, the reality that legislatures, like past courts, can be both “skillful and unskillful, clear
and unclear, wise and unwise,” courts must be allowed creative license in making sure
that the statute at issue “make[s] sense” as applied to the present situation – within the
permissible bounds of legal argumentation, of course.25
Though supportive of judges’ use of sociologically “legitimate” arguments to reach
practically sensible outcomes, Llewellyn did nonetheless criticize the interpretive canons
as judges employed them.26 As with case law, Llewellyn contended, courts in statutory
cases had continued to adhere to the “foolish pretense” that the interpretive questions
presented in the context of appellate litigation admit of “only one single correct answer.”27
Until judges “give up” that pretense, he continued, “there must be a set of mutually
contradictory correct rules on How to Construe Statutes.”28 It is at this point that Llewellyn
set forth his now-famous table of “thrusts” and “parries.”29 Assembled by research
assistant Charles Driscoll, the table identified pairs of supposedly contradictory canons
of construction, including what today we refer to as “substantive” canons like the
presumption against retroactivity (paired with an authorization for judges to construe
remedial statutes retroactively should doing so “promote the ends of justice”), but with
much greater emphasis on what we call “linguistic” or “semantic” canons.30 Llewellyn
contrasted, for example, the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon31 with the
interpretive maxim that statutory language “may fairly comprehend many different cases
where some only are expressly mentioned by way of example,”32 or, similarly, the
presumption against surplusage33 with the authorization to “reject[] as surplusage”
language “inadvertently inserted or … repugnant to the rest of the statute.”34 (Of special
relevance here, Llewellyn also paired the presumption that “[q]ualifying or limiting words
of clauses are to be referred to the next preceding antecedent” with the qualification that
said presumption has no application “when evident sense and meaning require a different
construction.”35)

25

Id.
Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 51 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005) (“Realist arguments for the rational
indeterminacy of law generally focused on the existence of conflicting, but equally legitimate, canons of
interpretation for precedents and statutes.”).
27 Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 399.
28 Id. (emphasis added).
29 Id. at 401-06.
30 Id. It is worth mentioning, though, that “semantic” canons is potentially a misnomer insofar as many of
those canons (e.g., expressio unius) correspond to pragmatic rather than semantic inference, as that
distinction is traditionally understood. See generally SEMANTICS VERSUS PRAGMATICS (Zoltán Gendler
Szabó, ed., 2005).
31 Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 405 (“Expression of one thing excludes another.”)
32 Id.
33 Id. at 404 (“Every word and clause must be given effect.”)
34 Id.
35 Id. at 405.
26
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At least according to the popular narrative, Llewellyn’s critique – and, in particular,
his “chart” – was profoundly impactful.36 John Manning, for example, remarked that “Karl
Llewellyn largely persuaded two generations of academics that the canons of construction
were not to be taken seriously.”37 Similarly, Cass Sunstein said that, following Llewellyn’s
“demonstration[,] … [a]lmost no one … had a favorable word to say about the canons [for]
many years.”38 Courts too expressed greater skepticism towards interpretive canons
during that period, though, in that instance, the causal significance of Llewellyn’s
arguments is far less certain as courts’ hesitancy with respect to canons may have
somewhat predated publication of his Remarks. In this respect, Llewellyn’s critique may
have merely captured a broader skepticism towards canons that was emerging at the
time.39
More generally, the apparent success of Llewellyn’s criticism of interpretive canons
plausibly had as much to do with the force of his arguments than with the perceived
availability of alternate interpretive tools. As Manning describes it, the loss of enthusiasm
for interpretive canons coincided with the rise of the Legal Process school of statutory
interpretation and, with it, a renewed enthusiasm for attention to legislative purpose. 40
Imagining legislators as “reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes
reasonably,”41 that school promised not only to imbue the law with moral content, critical
with the rise of fascism abroad and its (wrongly42) perceived relationship with a
thoroughgoing legal positivism, but also to allow judges to continue to act as faithful
agents of Congress, “(at least putatively) implementing the goals that the democratically
elected legislature had selected.”43 More concretely, Manning argues, decreasing
reliance on canons as an interpretive tool was offset by increasing reliance on legislative

36

John F. Manning, Legal Realism & the Canons' Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 283, 283 (2002) [hereinafter
Manning, Legal Realism & the Canons' Revival] (“With less impact, earlier realists had made similar claims.
But Llewellyn made a chart.”).
37 Id. at 283-84.
38 Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 452 (1989). See
also, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909, 913 (2016) (noting “Llewellyn article's
tremendous influence on statutory interpretation scholars”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 593
(1992) (calling Llewellyn’s essay “one of the most celebrated law review articles of all time”).
39 While Llewellyn’s argument depended largely upon its fit with the experience of its audience,
contemporary legal scholars have offered more systematic evidence in support of the position that the
applicability of individual canons is under-determined. See Krishnakumar, supra note 38, at 955 (conducting
an empirical study of the Supreme Court’s use of “dueling” interpretive canons in recent statutory cases,
finding evidence “suggest[ing] that the canons do not constrain the Justices on the … Court to vote
against their policy preferences”).
40 Manning, Legal Realism & the Canons' Revival, supra note 36 at 286.
41 Id. (quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to Henry
M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems, in THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF
LAW: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, eds, 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
42 See HERLINDE PAUER-STUDER, JUSTIFYING INJUSTICE: LEGAL THEORY IN NAZI GERMANY 203-39 (2020)
(arguing that Nazi law sought specifically to unify law and the morality of the Volk).
43 Id. (citations omitted).

6

history, which, despite earlier Legal Realist critiques by those like Max Radin, was more
and more viewed as reliable evidence of “what Congress was really trying to get at.”44
On Manning’s assessment, then, Llewellyn succeeded in discrediting interpretive
canons largely because judges and scholars had identified other interpretive tools that
allowed them to at least purport to be effectuating Congress’s aims rather than merely
exercising judicial discretion. Those conditions of success were ironic, of course, insofar
as the core of Llewellyn’s critique was that the exercise of discretion was unavoidable
when interpreting statutes in the context of appellate litigation, and that it was, in turn, the
“foolish” denial of this reality that motivated the embarrassing contradictions his table was
intended to highlight.45 Be that as it may, because a more candid Legal Realism had come
to be viewed as both democratically and morally concerning, the legacy of Llewellyn’s
critique was less the abandonment of the “pretense” that judges do not exercise
substantial discretion in appellate decisionmaking, as Llewellyn urged, but rather the
discrediting of one set of interpretive tools as inherently manipulable and so ultimately
pretextual and the elevation of some other set of tools supposedly free of, or at least
substantially less burdened by, those defects.46

B. The Rise
Though “interred” for decades by Llewellyn’s criticism,47 interpretive canons
enjoyed a renaissance with the emergence of modern textualism in the 1980s. Widely
understood today as the dominant method of statutory interpretation among judges, the
success of modern textualism is as much a political story as it is an intellectual one.
Beginning in the early 1980s under the leadership of Attorney General William French
Smith and later Attorney General Edwin Meese, conservative lawyers within the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) began to emphasize the importance of adhering to text in
both statutory and constitutional interpretation.48 To some extent, this prioritization of
statutory text was spillover from the ongoing project of popularizing and legitimizing
constitutional originalism, which, as political scientist Calvin TerBeek has documented,
was principally advanced by conservative political operatives as an alternative to the kind
of “living constitutionalism” practiced by the Warren Court in cases like Brown v. Board of
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Id. at 288 (discussing Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930)).
Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 399.
46 Id.
47 David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 923 (1992)
48 See, e.g., Memorandum from Arnold I. Burns, Deputy Att’y Gen., et.al to Stephen J. Markman, Acting
Assistant Att’y Gen. (October 29, 1986) (on file with author) (“[C]onstitutional language should be construed
as it was publicly understood at the time of its drafting and ratification and government attorneys should
advance constitutional arguments based only on this "original meaning... As with constitutional adjudication,
statutory adjudication starts from the proposition that the words of the statute have a meaning that
constrains judgment; statutory language should be construed as it would have been publicly understood at
the time of its enactment.”)
45
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Education.49 More generally, the belief among conservative lawyers within the DOJ was
that a central problem of legal liberalism was its continuous straying from legal text,
whether statutory or constitutional. In response to this perceived problem, DOJ lawyers
deliberately presented textualism as a methodological alternative in both interpretive
domains.50 Meanwhile, within the legal academy, scholars like Frank Easterbrook and
Antonin Scalia began to develop more theoretically sophisticated defenses and
understandings of textualism, building partly on earlier Legal Realist arguments
concerning the absence of shared intentions within multi-member legislative bodies as
well as more recent work by public choice theorists, which offered both a more cynical
picture of lawmaking than that associated with Legal Process as well as further resources
for skepticism about (actual, historical) legislative purpose as an object of judicial
inquiry.51
With the appointment of figures like Easterbrook and Scalia to the federal bench,
along with DOJ alumni like Kenneth Starr, textualism began to settle as the preferred
method of statutory interpretation among conservative judges. And as the Republican
Party retained its commitment to textualism (and originalism) through subsequent
presidential administrations, further appointments of both judges and justices with those
methodological commitments permitted both earlier and more recent conservative
appointees to exercise significant influence over judicial practice in statutory cases. Such
influence was most visible at the level of the Supreme Court, where the elevation of Scalia
and Clarence Thomas in particular afforded textualism significant institutional legitimacy
and, more practically, permitted textualists to extract methodological concessions from
their liberal colleagues – refusing, for example, to join (portions of) opinions relying upon
legislative history, leading to its decreasing use.52
Following the success of this political project, it is unsurprising that newly
appointed textualist judges would express greater enthusiasm than their Legal Process
Calvin TerBeek, “Clocks Must Always Be Turned Back”: Brown v. Board of Education and the Racial
Origins of Constitutional Originalism, 115 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 3 (2021).
50 See, e.g., Intercircuit Panel: Hearing on S. 704 Before the Subcom. on Cts., S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong. 3 n.3 (1985) (statement of James M. Spears, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen.) (“The Court has
contributed to the trend in which the role of judges is viewed less as one of interpreting the Constitution and
statutes, guided principally by their text and the legislative intent of the Framers and Congress, and more
as one of resolving public policy questions as guided by the perceived values of an enlightened society.
This Administration has consistently challenged, and taken steps to reverse, this trend of moving from
interpretivism to judicial activism.”).
51 See, e.g., Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, supra note 13.
52 As Thomas Merrill explains it:
A better explanation for the triumph of textualism, in my opinion, lies not so much in Justice Scalia's
persuasiveness as in his persistence. The critical factor here is Justice Scalia's practice of refusing
to join any part of another Justice's opinion that relies on legislative history. This means that in any
case in which another Justice needs the vote of Justice Scalia to form a majority or controlling
opinion, the writing Justice knows that if legislative history is employed he or she will lose majority
status with respect to at least a portion of the opinion. The arrival of Justice Thomas, who has taken
up a similar stance, effectively doubles Justice Scalia's voting clout in this regard.
Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 365 (1994).
49
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predecessors for interpretive canons – in particular, linguistic or semantic canons – and
thereby legitimize their use. With its attention to precise phrasing and grammatical
nuance, interpretive canons that correspond to familiar linguistic subtleties like expressio
unius or ejusdem generis fit naturally within a textualist approach to statutory
interpretation. In turn, it makes sense that legal academics of all types would find new
appreciation for interpretive canons given their professional interest in preserving
relevance with an increasingly textualist judiciary. And find new appreciation they did, as
scholars across the ideological spectrum began to suggest that perhaps interpretive
canons could be a useful tool after all.
Even in this highly conducive political environment, though, developments in legal
theory plausibly contributed to, or at least shaped, the reintroduction of interpretive
canons. Part of this apparent contribution was negative, with theoretical arguments from
textualist legal academics rendering alternatives to interpretive canons less available.
Drawing upon earlier Legal Realist reasoning and more contemporary work in public
choice theory, textualist scholars, and in turn judges, called into question specifically the
value of legislative history as an interpretive aid.53 The apparent probative value of
legislative history had been important to the case that inquiries into legislative purpose
amounted to something other than covert exercises of judicial discretion. 54 By making
such appeals seem less obviously credible, textualist thinkers thus helped recreate – or,
maybe better, re-reveal – the vacuum of legal determinacy in statutory cases that
legislative history, and more generally legislative purpose, had purported to fill.
Building on this opportunity, textualist scholars and judges emphasized
simultaneously the virtues of determinacy and constraint that their preferred method
supposedly offered.55 And with interpretive canons in particular, scholars of various
ideological and methodological stripes contended that the use of such canons contributed
to legal determinacy by making legal interpretation more predictable. Manning, for
example, promised that the use of linguistic or semantic canons could “foster” common
“linguistic and syntactic rules” for legislators and their various audiences.56 Contributing
to a shared legal language, the use of canons could thus help facilitate effective
53

See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97-100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); Cont'l Can Co. v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union
(Indep.) Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157-60 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.).
54 See Manning, Legal Realism & the Canons' Revival, supra note 36, at 287-89
55 See, e.g., Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, supra note 9, at 17-18 (“The practical
threat is that, under the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents,
common-law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending their lawmaking
proclivities; from the common law to the statutory
field.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 59, 62 (1988) (“The use of original intent rather than an objective inquiry into the reasonable import
of the language permits a series of moves. Each move greatly increases the discretion, and therefore the
power, of the court.”); see also William Baude, Originalism as a Constraint on Judges, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
2213
(2018) (discussing the legacy of “constraint” arguments by interpretive formalists in constitutional law,
suggesting a decreasing reliance in that context).
56 Manning, Legal Realism & the Canons' Revival, supra note 36 at 292.
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“communication of legislative directions.”57 More ambitiously, Sunstein, and later William
Baude and Stephen Sachs, argued that appeal to both linguistic and substantive canons
was mostly unavoidable because judges are frequently confronted with “textual silence”
and so resort to “background principles” is necessary to fill legislative “gaps” in a legally
determinate fashion.58
For textualists specifically, resort to ‘gap-filling’ talk was slightly awkward given that
method’s emphasis on fidelity to congressional aims and, more importantly, the
illegitimacy of judicial lawmaking.59 Even Manning’s more modest thought that the use of
canons might help generate – as opposed to merely reflect – shared interpretive norms
faces difficulties in view of recent empirical work suggesting that legislative actors are
largely inattentive to judicial cues concerning how to use statutory language. More
immediately, though, these different arguments from “predictability” all depend upon a
rejection of Llewellyn’s fundamental empirical claim that the interpretive canons
themselves are contradictory. (Llewellyn’s basic argument, after all, was that the
application of contradictory canons created the illusion of legal determinacy, not its
reality.60) And while Sunstein and others made some effort to show that Llewellyn’s claim
that the canons were contradictory and so unconstraining was “greatly overstated,”
insisting, for example, that the principle that courts should construe statutes in derogation
of the common law narrowly undoubtedly informs judges’ “sense” of the relevant statutory
“situation[s],” the popularity of Llewellyn’s argument reflected less revelation to legal
practitioners that their interpretive idols were false than resonance with lawyers’ ‘whole
experience’ with statutory cases and the apparent manipulability of these supposed legal
principles.61 Against that pessimistic backdrop, it is somewhat difficult to imagine that
assurances like those of Sunstein played a meaningful role in restoring interpretive
canons as a legitimate interpretive tool.
Beyond determinacy and constraint, however, proponents of modern textualism
also highlighted that method’s special attention to interpretive context. Contrasting their
view with earlier “plain-meaning” textualists who placed emphasis on “literal meaning,”
modern textualists purported to incorporate insights from philosophers of language such
as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Paul Grice, recognizing that words only gather meaning in a
context of use.62 Easterbrook, for example, observed that “words are not born with
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meanings” but instead “take their meaning from contexts, of which there are many.”63
(Easterbrook simultaneously disparages dictionaries as mere “museum[s] of words”. 64)
So too Scalia, who declared it a “fundamental principle of statutory construction (and,
indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation,
but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.”65 Rather than fetishize dictionary
definitions and the like, modern textualists thus interpreted, or at least aspired to interpret,
specific words or phrases in view of a statute’s subject matter, its internal coherence, or
surrounding legislation, all with a view to understanding what a “reasonable user of words”
would have taken that language to mean as used.66 Such attention to linguistic nuance
showed that modern textualists grasped that words were practical instruments used to
“do things,”67 with Easterbrook stating, for instance, that “we use [texts] purposively,”
which is why “meaning … will change with context, and over time” as do our practical
ends.68 Having adopted this sort of linguistic pragmatism (in the Wittgensteinian or
Gricean sense, not the Posnerian), modern textualists positioned themselves to rebut
criticisms like those of Llewellyn, who accused earlier plain-meaning textualists of
“eviscerate[ing]” statutes through “wooden and literal reading.”69 Far from ‘wooden,’
modern textualism promised to be nimble, sophisticated, and, most importantly, attentive
to the practical interests at stake.
This embrace of context sensitivity was reflected specifically in the way modern
textualists talked about interpretive canons. Having expressly rejected the use of “rigid”
interpretive methods, modern textualists distanced themselves from the idea that the
canons were rules that make statutory interpretation more mechanical.70 To the contrary,
Scalia insisted, “canons of interpretation … are not ‘rules’ of interpretation in any strict
sense,” but instead constitute interpretive “presumptions” that can be negated by context,
often quite easily.71 Thus, in his treatise with attorney and lexicographer Brian Garner,
Scalia cataloged canons of all different types, from “semantic” to “syntactic” to
“contextual,” underscoring again and again the “defeasible” nature of these various
interpretive maxims.72 Clarence Thomas, the other most powerful judicial proponent of
textualism at the time, likewise remarked that “canons of construction” are mere “rules of
context to textual analysis, see Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J.
979, 986-99 (2017).
63 Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
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Easterbrook appears to run together various senses of “context sensitivity,” as is typical of early modern
textualist writing.
64 Id. at 67.
65 Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (Scalia, J.).
66 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
59, 65 (1988).
67 HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS, THE WILLIAM JAMES LECTURES BY J. L. AUSTIN (J. O. Urmson, ed., 1962).
68 Easterbrook, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, supra note 63, at 61.
69 Llewellyn, supra note 2 at 400.
70 Doerfler, supra note 62, at 1044 n.209.
71 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 12.
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thumb”73 that “must yield ‘when the whole context dictates a different conclusion.’” 74 And
so on, and so on.75 By emphasizing so explicitly and so repeatedly the context sensitivity
of interpretive canons, modern textualism thereby meaningfully defused Llewellyn’s
criticism that those canons as used were contradictory. That criticism, after all, rested
upon the premise that interpretive canons pretended to operate like rigid, determinate
rules. By explicitly rejecting that premise, modern textualists were free to say without
embarrassment that sometimes the expression of one thing excludes another while other
times things are expressly mentioned only by way of example, that usually every word
and clause should be given effect, but that in some circumstances it is appropriate to
reject statutory language as inadvertent surplusage.

*

*

*

To recap, while the readmission of interpretive canons into polite legal society was
substantially a political story, developments within legal theory plausibly informed that
readmission in two ways. First, by playing up the constraint canons supposedly bring to
the interpretive process, proponents of interpretive canons promised that their use could
help bring additional determinacy to statutory interpretation, which was especially
important given recent criticisms concerning the use of legislative history, often by those
same individuals. Second, building on more general insights concerning the sensitivity of
language to context, proponents of interpretive canons took care to explain that such
canons were mere generalizations about usage, and that evidence specific to a given
case could always render them inapplicable. In so arguing, proponents of interpretive
canons largely undercut Llewellyn’s critique that such canons are contradictory, a critique
that depended, again, on the idea that interpretive canons operate like legal rules,
determinate and with clear conditions of application.
Importantly, there is an apparent tension between these two lines of argument, as
discussed more fully below. The core of Llewellyn’s critique was that it was a “foolish”
belief in legal determinacy in statutory cases at the appellate stage that led judges to act
as if interpretive canons are (inevitably contradictory) rules.76 By insisting that interpretive
canons are not rules but instead defeasible presumptions, modern textualists were mostly
able to explain away Llewellyn’s critique, but only by conceding that interpretive canons
73
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are less conducive to legal determinacy – which is just the same as saying less “wooden”
– than one might have otherwise hoped. By contrast, arguments to the effect that
interpretive canons are a source of constraint and, in turn, legal determinacy seem to
depend on one’s imagining that interpretive canons operate more like rules. As this Essay
discusses below, other resources within modern textualism partially obscured this
tension. With judges (and to some extent scholars) increasingly transitioning, however,
from modern to what one might call ‘late-stage’ textualism, that tension has very much
come to the fore.

III. Canons of Interpretation Today
Fast forward now to October Term 2020. In Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid,77 the
Supreme Court was presented with a discrete question of statutory interpretation. Under
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”),78 it is unlawful to make any
non-emergency call (including text message) to any cellular number using an “automatic
telephone dialing system” without the express consent of the recipient.79 The Act, in turn,
defines “automatic telephone dialing system” as equipment having the “capacity” to “store
or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number
generator,” and to “dial such numbers.”80 Here, Noah Duguid had received multiple text
messages from Facebook alerting him that his account had been accessed from an
unrecognized device or browser, a security measure Facebook provides to help prevent
unauthorized access. The problem was that Duguid had no Facebook account and so
had never consented to receiving such messages. After repeated, unsuccessful attempts
to unsubscribe from this service, Duguid filed suit under the TCPA, alleging that
Facebook’s unsolicited text messages were in violation of the Act’s “robocall” prohibition
described above.81
In Duguid, the specific interpretive question was whether Facebook’s unsolicited
messages were in violation of the TCPA even though the Facebook computers used to
send those messages neither stored nor produced the phone numbers dialed using a
random or sequential number generator. According to Duguid, that Facebook had dialed
only numbers entered into its system by Facebook users was beside the point because
the limiting phrase “using a random or sequential number generator” as used in the
statute modifies only the second of the two verbs in the preceding clause, “produce.” In
other words, as construed by Duguid, so long as Facebook had automatically text
messaged numbers “stored” in its system without the recipients’ consent, that was
enough to violate the anti-robocalling provision.82 (On Duguid’s reading, the other way to
violate the statute was to automatically message numbers “produce[d] … using a random
77

141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021).
42 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.
79 Id. at § 227(b)(1)(A). The statute also specifically exempted unsolicited calls for the purpose of debt
collection. But see Barr v. Am. Ass'n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020) (declaring the
exemption in violation of the First Amendment).
80 Id. at § 227(a)(1).
81 Duguid, 141 S. Ct. at 1167.
82 Id. at 1169.
78

13

or sequential number generator.”) In response, Facebook argued that the phrase “using
a random or sequential number generator” modified both verbs in the preceding clause,
“store” and “produce,” such that a caller would have to use a device that could either
“store … numbers … using a random or sequential number generator” or “produce …
numbers … using a random or sequential number generator” to be in violation of the
statute.83
By a unanimous vote, the Supreme Court sided with Facebook. Writing for eight
justices, Justice Sonya Sotomayor “beg[an],” as justices do, “with the text.”84 The statute’s
“definition,” Sotomayor noted, “uses a familiar structure: a list of verbs followed by a
modifying clause.” “Under conventional rules of grammar,” she explained, “‘[w]hen there
is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series,’ a
modifier at the end of the list ‘normally applies to the entire series.’”85 This “seriesqualifier” canon was straightforwardly applicable, Sotomayor continued, since “the
modifier at issue immediately follows a concise, integrated clause: ‘store or produce
telephone numbers to be called.’” Because this “clause ‘hangs together as a unified
whole,’” with the word ‘or’ … connect[ing] two verbs that share a common direct object,
‘telephone numbers to be called,’” it would be “odd to apply the modifier (‘using a random
or sequential number generator’) to only a portion of this cohesive preceding clause.”86
Sotomayor contrasted the series-qualifier canon with the inapplicable “rule of the last
antecedent,” invoked by Duguid.87 Under that rule, “a limiting clause or phrase should
ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.”88 The
rule of the last antecedent, Sotomayor clarified, was “context dependent,” and one the
Court had declined to apply “where, like here, the modifying clause appears after an
integrated list.”89 Worse still for Duguid, the “last antecedent before ‘using a random or
sequential number generator’” was “not ‘produce,’ … but rather ‘telephone numbers to be
called,’” thus depriving Duguid of any “grammatical basis” for his otherwise “arbitrar[y]”
reading.90 Sotomayor similarly rejected Duguid’s appeal to the “distributive” canon,
according to which a “sentence contain[ing] several antecedents and several
consequents,” should be read “distributively … apply[ing] the words to the subjects which,
by context, they seem most properly to relate.”91 That canon was of “highly questionable”
application, Sotomayor insisted, “given there are two antecedents (store and produce)
but only one consequent modifier (using a random or sequential number generator),” and
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besides, “the consequent ‘using a random or sequential number generator’ properly
relates to both antecedents.”92
As Justice Samuel Alito observed in his separate concurrence, Sotomayor’s (along
with seven other justices’) use of canons in Duguid is almost comically “mechanical[].”93
Notions like “concise, integrated clause[s]” or some clause having “only one consequent
modifier” as opposed to two (or three or four) are presented as determinative of legal
outcomes – offered as “a series of if-then computations,” to use Alito’s phrasing.94 More
generally, the series-qualifier canon upon which Sotomayor places so much weight is
characterized explicitly as a “rule[] of grammar,” with narrow and specifically defined
exceptions, Sotomayor suggests.95 This picture of interpretive canons as rules is,
needless to say, directly at odds with the teachings of modern textualism, which
emphasized again and again that canons are “highly sensitive to context” and the
application of which requires the sort of holistic and ultimately practical engagement with
text, a type of engagement natural language competency so plainly involves.96 Rather
than conceive of them as “limit[ed]” and heavily “caveat[ed]” generalizations about
linguistic usage, however, the Court here was opting, as in so many recent cases, to treat
interpretive canons as “rigid” and “inflexible rules,” precisely the conception of canons
that Llewellyn successfully ridiculed.97
So how did we get here? Five years earlier, the pair of interpretive canons that
feature most prominently in Duguid – the series-qualifier canon and the rule of the last
antecedent – took on contemporary relevance in Lockhart v. United States.98 In that case,
the provision at issue imposed a 10–year mandatory minimum sentence enhancement
for persons convicted of possessing child pornography if they have a “prior conviction ...
under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive
sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.”99 The defendant in Lockhart had a prior statecourt conviction for first-degree sexual abuse of an adult, raising the question whether the
qualifying phrase “involving a minor or ward” modified only the adjacent “abusive sexual
conduct” or also the earlier offenses in the list.100 The Supreme Court divided six to two
in favor of the government. Writing for the majority, Sotomayor assured that here the
applicable canon was the rule of the last antecedent, which, she explained, “reflects the
basic intuition that when a modifier appears at the end of a list, it is easier to apply that
modifier only to the item directly before it.”101 In support of this intuition, Sotomayor relied
substantially on ordinary language examples, observing, for instance, that if the general
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manager of the New York Yankees were to instruct her scouts “to find a defensive catcher,
a quick-footed shortstop, or a pitcher from last year's World Champion Kansas City
Royals,” it would be “natural” for the scouts to limit their search for a pitcher to members
of last year’s Royals but to look more broadly for a catcher or shortstop. 102 In dissent,
Justice Elena Kagan countered Sotomayor’s rule-of-the-last-antecedent “thrust” with a
“parry” of the series-qualifier canon.103 Like Sotomayor, Kagan’s argument depended
significantly on ordinary language examples, offering that a real estate agent who
promises “to find a client ‘a house, condo, or apartment in New York’” is unlikely to send
“information about condos in Maryland or California.”104
Returning to Duguid, there, too, Sotomayor supplemented her more schematic
arguments for the applicability of the series-qualifier canon with yet another ordinary
language example, this time asking the reader to imagine a teacher announcing that
“students must not complete or check any homework to be turned in for a grade, using
online homework-help websites.”105 In that instance, Sotomayor observed (correctly106) it
would make no sense to regard the teacher as prohibiting students from completing their
homework generally. And yet, as Alito objected in his concurrence, and as the back and
forth between Sotomayor and Kagan in Lockhart makes clear, the availability of examples
like this shows very little insofar as one could easily conjure an example with the same
superficial grammatical structure generating the opposite linguistic intuition.107 (For his
part, Alito offers several, including, “It is illegal to hunt rhinos and giraffes with necks
longer than three feet.”)108 What the availability of such competing examples suggests, of
course, is that the same orderings of words and punctuations can be used to different
practical effects, precisely the lesson of modern textualism and its insistence upon the
importance of attending to interpretive context. And so (yet?), with arguments by example
having been revealed as under-determinate – in part, by her having offered contrary
examples in her earlier Lockhart opinion – it makes some sense that Sotomayor would
rely more heavily on more abstract argumentation by the time of Duguid. By appealing to
concepts like “concise, integrated clause[s]” and the like, her Duguid opinion achieves a
tone of formality, of “technical[ity],” that creates, for some at least, the impression of
law.109
Or does it really? As discussed more fully below, the reasoning in Duguid and
other, similarly textually oriented opinions from this Term were met with widespread
derision, with legal commentators coming close to (or even outright) mocking the justices
102
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for discussing at length the placement of punctuations, the use of certain grammatical
articles, and the like to explain judgments affecting matters as important as the right to an
immigration hearing or potential criminal liability for workplace misconduct. Such
frustration among legal scholars and journalists should hardly come as a surprise. As
much as “we” may all be “textualists now,”110 we are also all now, at least to some extent,
Legal Realists. As such, efforts at mystification and appeal to “arcane rules” are less likely
to succeed with legally sophisticated audiences, whose ‘whole experience’ with the law
has shown them that such technicalities rarely determine outcomes in cases litigated
before the Supreme Court.111 With Duguid in particular, Sotomayor and the other justices
could not help that legal commentators were reading their canon-centric opinion in a postLlewellyn world.
Whatever the success of her efforts, the claim in this Part is that Sotomayor’s
treatment of interpretive canons in Duguid as legal rules is an illustration of a broader
trend among the justices not only of relying upon canons in statutory cases but of
portraying those canons as ‘mechanical’ and so outcome determinative. This portrayal is,
again, directly at odds with efforts by modern textualists to defuse Llewellyn’s critique of
modern canons as contradictory by emphasizing that canons are not legal rules but are
instead generalizations about ordinary linguistic practice the application of which involves
careful attention to the specifics of the practical setting in which the legal text at issue was
authored and intended to be read. This tendency to portray interpretive canons as rules
reflects, at the same time, another line of argument within modern textualism, which
promises that the use of canons brings greater predictability and so greater determinacy
to judicial decision-making in statutory cases. As cases like Duguid bring out, these two
lines of argument for modern textualists are inherently in tension insofar as emphasizing
the context-sensitive nature of interpretive canons is just the same as saying that canons
are insufficiently “rigid” to decide cases in a predictable, “if-then” fashion. By resolving
that tension in favor of legal determinacy, the current Court has thus given new life to
Llewellyn’s “dueling canons” critique. It has also contributed to what this Essay calls ‘late’
textualism looking increasingly foolish, with grammatical pedantry (or, really, sophistry)
offered as legal justification in cases with real human stakes.112

IV. Late-Stage Textualism and Legal Determinacy
If the embarrassing use of interpretive canons in cases like Duguid is attributable
partly to the belief that canons add predictability and so determinacy to statutory
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interpretation, an immediate question is why this would be a problem only recently.
Modern textualism, after all, has been extolling these purported virtues of interpretive
canons for decades, and textualism has been the principal method of statutory
interpretation among federal judges for almost as long. And to be sure, treatments of
canons as ‘if-then’ devices are scattered throughout the Supreme Court and Federal
Reporters in decisions from the 1990s and early 2000s. Still, the use of interpretive
canons does appear more frequent in recent years, and, as Alito observed in his Duguid
concurrence, canons seem to play an especially “prominent” role in statutory
interpretation cases today.113
So, what might explain this placing of greater weight on interpretive canons? As
before, part of the story is political. Though textualism has been an influential method of
statutory interpretation among Supreme Court justices since the appointment of Scalia in
1986, the recent appointments of Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney
Barrett, all avowed textualists, has made it all but impossible to assemble a majority in a
statutory case without heavy reliance on textual arguments. (Here, Kagan’s appointment
is also significant in that it marked the acceptance of textualism as a bipartisan method
of interpretation among the justices.) Under these conditions, it makes sense that a justice
like Sotomayor, though not obviously committed to textualism as a philosophical matter,
would nonetheless phrase her arguments in terms of interpretive canons (and linguistic
terminology more generally) rather than relying on, say, legislative history.
Beyond that narrowly political explanation, though, shifts in textualist thinking also
plausibly contributed to treatment of interpretive canons as legal rules. As described at
various places, there is, or better was, a tension between modern textualism’s insistence
that interpretive canons are highly sensitive to context and its claim that the use of canons
increases predictability and so determinacy in statutory cases. At the same time, modern
textualism contained resources reducing the practical significance of that tension.
Specifically, textualists like Easterbrook and Scalia articulated a commitment (or at least
aspiration) to judicial non-intervention in the absence of ‘clearly' identifiable law. Though
voiced sometimes concerning constitutional cases, a principle of non-intervention was
more comprehensively theorized and adhered to at least somewhat more reliably by
textualists in the context of statutory interpretation.114

A. Legal Theory
Within legal theory, probably the canonical statement of a principle of nonintervention in statutory cases is Easterbrook’s 1983 article, Statutes’ Domains. In that
paper, Easterbrook offered a defense of a text-centric approach to statutory interpretation
grounded substantially in public choice theory. Advancing the idea that it is “difficult” if not
113
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“impossible” to aggregate the preferences of individual legislators into a “coherent
collective choice,” Easterbrook reasoned that features of the legislative process like
agenda control and “logrolling” made it the case that judicial “predictions” of how
legislatures would have resolved unanticipated cases were “bound to be little more than
wild guesses.”115 Construing statutory language in any case in which Congress’s written
instruction was less than “clear” was, accordingly, an unavoidably “creative” endeavor.116
The question for Easterbrook, then, was whether or when judges should exercise this sort
of discretion. In some instances, Congress “plainly” delegates authority to federal courts
to shape statutes, “creat[ing] and revis[ing] a form of common law”—with the Sherman
Act, in Easterbrook’s view, the most uncontroversial example.117 In the absence of such
unmistakable delegation, though, Easterbrook concluded that judges should refrain from
construing a statute to resolve a case that its language does not specifically settle.
Without a sense of what faithful construction would involve, courts should instead declare
that the case falls “outside the statute’s domain,” leaving the legal status quo
unchanged.118
Even as they moved away from public choice, modern textualists continued to urge
non-intervention. Beginning in the mid-1990s and early 2000s, textualists placed greater
emphasis on the more prosaic observation that compromise and tradeoffs are inherent to
the legislative process because legislators are always pursuing multiple goals. Even a
Congress earnestly committed to confronting climate change, for example, would need
to balance its interest in a rapid reduction of carbon emissions with its desire to equitably
distribute the burdens of transitioning from fossil fuels, its commitment to preserving
biodiversity, and so on. Addressing such choices, members of Congress sometimes settle
upon specific compromises, prohibiting, say, the licensing of new nuclear power plants or
a federal job guarantee for displaced fossil fuel workers. Other times, though, members
opt merely to identify their various goals, leaving it to some other actor, most often an
agency, to work out the specifics. Against this backdrop, theorists like Manning argued
that attending carefully to statutory language, and in particular to the level of generality at
which Congress speaks, was critical to respecting and facilitating such legislative
“bargains.”119 Adhering to the specifics of legislative language would both increase fidelity
to Congress and decrease judicial discretion, these theorists argued, contrasting modern
textualism with the “strong” purposivism associated with cases like Church of the Holy
Trinity v United States.120
Alongside this discussion of tradeoff, modern textualists emphasized increasingly
the importantly limited role of the federal judiciary within our constitutional system. In his
115

Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, supra note 13, at 547-48.
Id. at 534.
117 Id. at 544. But see Sanjukta Paul, Recovering the Moral Economy Foundations of the Sherman Act, 131
YALE L.J. 175 (2021) (contesting the status of the Sherman Act as a “common law” statute); Daniel A.
Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There a Text in This Class?” The Conflict Between Textualism and
Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619, 641 (2005) (same).
118 Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, supra note 13, at 544.
119 Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, supra note 10, at 18.
120 Id. at 15-16.
116

19

canonical A Matter of Interpretation, published in 1997, Scalia noted the “uncomfortable
relationship of common-law lawmaking to democracy,” reasoning that “the attitude of a
common-law judge,” which aimed at achieving “desirable” outcomes, was inappropriate
in an “age of legislation” and “regulation.”121 Similarly, Easterbrook insisted in 1994 that
judges were “faithful agents, not independent principals,” and that earlier methods of
interpretation that “liberate[d]” judges were “objectionable on grounds of democratic
theory as well as on grounds of predictability.”122 As Manning observed, arguments
concerning the limited authority of judges within our democracy were partly legal and
partly normative, with emphasis on the constitutional assignment of policymaking
authority to the political branches. More broadly, though, the picture that emerged,
especially in more public settings, was one of judges as faithful agents, tasked,
appropriately within a democracy, with identifying law rather than making it.123 This picture
of judging was captured most famously by Chief Justice John Roberts’s analogizing of
judges to “umpires.”124 (Ironic, given Roberts’ comparative lack of commitment to
interpretive formalism.125) Even in more sophisticated writings, though, the continuing
suggestion was that judges were to abstain from asserting their own policy preferences,
especially under the guise of ‘discovering’ law where there was none.
As the previous comment suggests, this picture of judging as law identification was
meant to be appropriately modern, incorporating to varying degrees insights from Legal
Realists concerning the widespread indeterminacy of the law. Easterbrook, as noted
above, conceded even in 1983 that the legal content of statutes often runs out in the
context of appellate litigation.126 Two decades later, Manning allowed similarly that “all
legal texts … produce ambiguities,” and that such ambiguities can be “‘liquidated’ only
through practice.”127 And even Scalia, though much more modest in this regard (more on
this below), confessed that in the “vast majority of cases” in which judges would deem a
statute “ambiguous” Congress did not “intend[] a single result.”128 This sort of humility
about legal determinacy led, predictably, to a discussion of official discretion. And while
textualist writers conceded that judicial discretion was, to some degree, unavoidable, the
presumption within our constitutional scheme was, again, that such discretion rests with
more democratically accountable actors. As discussed below, this presumption had
specific doctrinal manifestations, with judges declining to intervene in one way or another
in the absence of ‘clearly’ identifiable law. Here, though, it is worth highlighting the broad
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sentiment among textualists that both legally and normatively, policymaking was better
left to officials with a democratic constituency, whether direct or indirect.
Moving ahead to the 2010s and beyond, textualists continue to adhere, for the
most part, to the idea that judges can and do find law rather than make it. At the same
time, there has been a notable distancing from the Legal Realist premise that the law is
frequently indeterminate, especially in the context of appellate adjudication. As discussed
below, this trend has been most striking within judicial reasoning. Also within the legal
academy, though, confidence in the determinacy of the law is on the rise among
interpretive formalists. Most prominently, Baude and Sachs have argued, in a much-cited
2017 piece, that although the communicative content of statutory language often runs
out, background legal principles determine systematically how judges ought to rule in
such cases.129 Even more strikingly, Sachs writing separately has argued that prevailing
skepticism about judges “finding” common law is unwarranted, arguing that discovering
unwritten legal rules was no more mysterious than identifying norms of fashion or
etiquette.130 Baude and Sachs’s confidence in the determinacy of this sort of ‘background’
law contrasts somewhat with the trend among formalist judges to insist upon the
determinacy of legal texts. Regardless, both of these trends reflect a distancing from
Legal Realism and so non-intervention. Even if judges should decline to intervene in the
absence of clearly identifiable law, that conditional becomes trivially satisfied if the law is
always clear upon closer inspection.131

B. Doctrine
Though always more aspiration than real commitment, textualist judges also
endorsed legal doctrines that were non-interventionist in both rationale and effect. Most
visible among them was the Chevron doctrine, which, up until very recently, was regarded
as one of the most important legal doctrines of the past half-century. It was articulated
first in a 1984 opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens, decidedly not a member of the
textualist vanguard but aligned ideologically with conservatives at the time. According to
Chevron, a reviewing court was to uphold an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it
administered so long as the statute did not “clear[ly]” preclude the agency’s reading. 132
Relevant in our context is the explicit justification of the doctrine in terms of legal
indeterminacy. To construe an unclear statute, Stevens reasoned, was to “fill” a “gap” in
the law left by Congress, and because courts, comparatively speaking, lacked both
technical expertise and democratic legitimacy, it made sense to defer to an agency’s
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construction in cases of statutory “silen[ce]” or “ambigu[ity].”133 To select among
“reasonable” constructions, Stevens explained, involved the sort of “policy choices” the
“responsibilit[y]” for which our Constitution “vests” not in the judiciary but instead “in the
political branches.”134
Despite having been authored by an adherent to the Legal Process school,
textualist judges and scholars quickly became Chevron’s strongest proponents – and
continued to be into the 2010s. Sparring with liberal colleagues like Justice Stephen
Breyer, Justice Scalia, for instance, vocally supported the doctrine for nearly all his judicial
career. Beginning with his 1989 law review article on the subject, Scalia explained his
support for Chevron mostly in the language of rules.135 A categorical instruction that
courts defer to an agency if the law is ambiguous, Scalia insisted, was superior to a caseby-case inquiry.136 Other textualists grounded their defenses of Chevron in a commitment
to democracy and, more specifically, the idea that policy determinations by judges should
not substitute for those of more democratically accountable officials. Manning, for
instance, reasoned that “because it is now generally accepted that the interpretation of
an ambiguous text will involve policymaking,” Chevron reflected “constitutional
commitments to electoral accountability” by presuming that Congress would prefer
agencies rather than courts to fill in statutory gaps.137 Similarly, D.C. Circuit Judge
Laurence Silberman explained that “Chevron rests on the sound premise that agencies
enjoy a comparative institutional advantage as a matter of legitimacy,” and that, while not
constitutionally compelled, “policy making should be eschewed by the federal judiciary
whenever possible.”138
While mostly uniform in their support of the doctrine, it is important not to overstate
textualists’ reluctance to displace agency readings. Scalia, for example, opined that
accepting Chevron was easier for textualist judges given their relative disposition to
identify ‘clear’ statutory meaning. Those “willing to permit the apparent meaning of a
statute to be impeached by the legislative history,” Scalia explained, “will more frequently
find agency-liberating ambiguity, and will discern a much broader range of ‘reasonable’
interpretation that the agency may adopt.”139 For a “‘strict constructionist’ of statutes,” by
contrast, the “meaning of a statute” is more often “apparent from its text and from its
relationship with other laws.”140 (Though using it approvingly here, Scalia would later
disavow the label “strict constructionist.”) Whatever the validity of Scalia’s empirical
premise, his comment indicates a continuing promise that textualism means greater legal
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determinacy.141 As such, the core tension persisted between greater attending to context
and making interpretation more predictable.
Enthusiasm for Chevron continued until sometime during President Barack
Obama’s second term. In the upper echelons of the federal judiciary, the turn against
Chevron began in earnest in 2015.142 That year, in a trio of concurring opinions, Justice
Thomas, previously a Chevron defender, argued for the first time that “the judicial power,
as originally understood, requires a court to exercise its independent judgment in
interpreting and expounding upon the laws,” and that this “power was understood to
include the power to resolve [statutory] ambiguities over time.”143 (In so arguing, Thomas
relied heavily upon historical work by Philip Hamburger, published in 2008—that is,
almost a decade prior.144) Thomas was joined shortly thereafter by Gorsuch, then still a
circuit court judge, in a concurring opinion to his own majority opinion in GutierrezBrizuela v. Lynch, in a seeming audition for a Supreme Court appointment. 145 And though
less vocal than either Thomas or Gorsuch, even Scalia began to express reservations,
though notably not on constitutional but statutory grounds. In a concurring opinion, he
remarked that Chevron was “[h]eedless of the original design of the [Administrative
Procedure Act],” which contemplated that the reviewing court, and not the agency, would
resolve statutory ambiguities “authoritatively.”146
Around this same time, opposition to Chevron also became an open political
project within the Republican Party.147 In 2016, the Party included a rejection of Chevron
in its platform, proclaiming that “courts should interpret the laws as written by Congress
rather than allowing executive agencies to rewrite those laws to suit administration
priorities,” after years of expressing no reservations.148 In 2016 and again in 2017, a
Republican House of Representatives passed legislative proposals explicitly negating
Chevron’s holding that statutory silence or ambiguity indicated an intention to delegate
141

Remarks like this approached their logical limit in later years as textualist judges turned against the
doctrine, with Judge Raymond Kethledge asserting, for instance, that he “personally” had “never had
occasion” to defer to an agency under Chevron since, in every instance, the underlying statute proved
“clear.” Raymond Kethledge, Ambiguities and Agency Cases: Reflections After (Almost) Ten Years on the
Bench, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 315, 323 (2017).
142 This turn was foreshadowed in 2013 in a dissent by Chief Justice John Roberts. See City of Arlington,
Tex. v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 314-16 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
143 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 575 U.S. 92, 119 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
144 See PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008).
145 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“But the
fact is Chevron... permit[s] executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative
power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the
Constitution of the framers' design.”).
146 Perez, 57 U.S. at 109 (Scalia, J., concurring).
147 Craig Green, Deconstructing the Administrative State: Chevron Debates and the Transformation of
Constitutional Politics, 101 B.U. L. REV. 619, 660-61 (2021)
148
REPUBLICAN
NAT’L
COMM.,
REPUBLICAN
PLATFORM
2016
10
(2016),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/sites/default/files/books/presidential-documents-archiveguidebook/national-political-party-platforms-of-parties-receiving-electoral-votes-1840-2016/117718.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2G62-L9JP].

23

primary interpretive authority to an administering agency.149 And most importantly,
throughout Donald Trump’s presidential term, the Republican Party, seemingly under the
guidance of Federalist Society co-chairman Leonard Leo, systematically added to the
federal judiciary individuals who expressed opposition to Chevron as well as more general
discomfort with the administrative state.150 Chevron in particular gained public attention
during the Supreme Court confirmation process for then-Judge Gorsuch, with the
previously obscure administrative law doctrine the subject of extended news coverage.
Following Gorsuch’s confirmation, the nomination of “anti-administrativists” to the lower
federal courts continued, such that, by 2018, the New York Times had identified
opposition to Chevron as a “litmus test” for Republican judicial appointments.151 This
political strategy appeared to reflect an assessment that conservative ideological interests
would be advanced by empowering the judiciary relative to the executive branch. And
understandably so, as Republicans had gained control of the federal bench, seemingly
for decades to come.152
Owing to the efforts of Gorsuch and Thomas, Chevron has been unmentionable in
the Supreme Court the past few years. Indeed, the very suggestion that an agency’s
reading might warrant special consideration has triggered mockery from Gorsuch in
particular.153 Such total disinterest in the reasoning of political branch actors was on full
display in Duguid. In that case, unmentioned in either opinion was the extensive
regulatory history surrounding the provision at issue. Under the TCPA, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) is authorized to “prescribe regulations to implement”
various provisions of the Act, including the subsection restricting the use of automatic
dialers.154 Pursuant to that statutory authority, the FCC promulgated an order in 1992
interpreting that subsection narrowly, construing it to exclude functions like speed dialing
and call forwarding, reasoning that “the numbers called are not generated in a random or
sequential fashion.”155 Eleven years later, though, responding to “significant changes in
the technologies and methods used to contact consumers,” the FCC construed the TCPA
as including “predictive dialers,” which “store pre-programmed numbers or receive
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numbers from a computer database and then dial those numbers in a manner that
maximizes efficiencies for call centers.”156 As a practical matter, the FCC reasoned that
“through the TCPA, Congress was attempting to alleviate a particular problem – an
increasing number of automated and prerecorded calls to certain categories of numbers,”
and that construing automatic dialers as equipment that dialed stored numbers
automatically, regardless of whether the numbers were randomly or sequentially
generated, best served this purpose.157 The FCC reiterated its position that predictive
dialers were automatic dialers in 2008, again in 2012, and finally in 2015. 158 Throughout
these orders, all adopted through notice and comment rulemaking and all enjoying the
“force of law,” the FCC emphasized again and again that changes in automatic dialing
technology necessitated an expansive reading of the automatic dialer provision since a
narrower reading would “render the TCPA's protections largely meaningless by ensuring
that little or no modern dialing equipment would fit the statutory definition.”159
As a linguistic matter, the FCC’s position was somewhat opaque. On the one hand,
the FCC seemed to rely upon a “broad interpretation” of the term “capacity,” explaining
that a device had the “capacity … to store or produce telephone numbers to be called,
using a random or sequential number generator,” and “to dial such numbers,” so long as
that device could be easily modified, through the downloading of software, for example,
so as to be able to perform the specified functions.160 The D.C. Circuit rejected that
reading as overbroad in a 2018 decision, reasoning that the FCC’s interpretation would
encompass most smartphones insofar as one could easily add software to such a phone
allowing it to function as an automatic dialer.161 In its orders, the FCC tried to limit the
scope of its interpretation by emphasizing that “the basic functions of an autodialer are to
‘dial numbers without human intervention’ and to ‘dial thousands of numbers in a short
period of time.’”162 “How the human intervention element applies to a particular piece of
equipment,” the FCC continued, “is specific to each individual piece of equipment, based
on how the equipment functions and depends on human intervention, and is therefore a
case-by-case determination.”163 In Duguid, the respondent offered exactly this argument
in response to Justice Sotomayor’s objection that his interpretation would encompass
“virtually all modern cell phones.”164 Dismissing that argument in a footnote, Sotomayor
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“decline[d] to interpret the TCPA as requiring such a difficult line-drawing exercise around
how much automation is too much.”165
In addition to its broad reading of “capacity,” the FCC also seemed to take up
Duguid’s position that a device need not have the “capacity … to store” telephone
numbers “using a random or sequential number generator,” explaining, for example, that
“[i]n the past, telemarketers may have used dialing equipment to create and dial 10-digit
telephone numbers arbitrarily,” but that the industry had “progressed to the point where”
it had become “far more cost effective” instead to “us[e] lists of numbers.” 166 As the D.C.
Circuit observed in its decision invalidating the relevant portion of the 2015 order, the FCC
was not entirely clear on this issue, however, and in the court’s view, while “[i]t might be
permissible for the Commission to adopt either interpretation,” it was “unreasonable” for
it to include language in the order suggesting both.167 (Unlike the Supreme Court, the
D.C. Circuit still treats Chevron as law, allowing it to say such things.)
Following the invalidation of its 2015 order, the FCC twice solicited comments from
interested parties on the scope of the auto dialer provision, but, by the time of Duguid,
had yet to issue a new order.168 Noting the FCC’s ongoing consideration of the matter, as
well as its lack of involvement in the litigation below, the Solicitor General declined to take
a position in Duguid at issue at the certiorari stage.169 During the merits briefing, though,
the United States sided with Facebook, explaining that after the D.C. Circuit’s 2018
decision vacating the FCC’s 2015 order, the FCC had no position on the issue, and that
in the view of the Solicitor General’s office, the better reading of the TCPA was the
narrower one recommended by the petitioner.170 In addition to standard interpretive
arguments, the Solicitor General observed as a matter of “policy” that Duguid’s reading
“could potentially sweep in every modern smartphone,” and that if, as the FCC had
claimed, “[t]echnological changes” were such that devices falling outside the Act’s
definition were “caus[ing] the same annoyance to consumers as the devices that the
TCPA restricts,” Congress could “amend the TCPA to take account of those changes.”171
One can only speculate what led the United States to abandon the earlier, more
consumer-protective position adopted by the FCC from 2003 to 2018.172 Regardless, this
complex and seemingly contentious policy debate within the executive branch makes no
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appearance in Duguid (beyond, perhaps, an unattributed, ‘icing-on-the-cake’
endorsement of the Solicitor General’s position that the earlier FCC reading was
overbroad). Such a discussion would have been interesting, of course, and would have
re-raised many of the questions dealt with in the cases developing Chevron about which
executive branch positions are warranting of deference (or “respect” or some other
weighting173) and under what conditions. Because the D.C. Circuit had invalidated the
FCC’s 2015 order, there was no agency interpretation enjoying the force of law to which
the Court could have deferred.174 At the same time, the Court could have at least
considered whether to assign significance to the position of the Solicitor General, whether
because the policy views of the Executive Branch more generally are better informed and
more democratically legitimate than those of federal judges, or becuase the Solicitor
General’s position was the best predictor of how the FCC would rule in the future.175
Relatedly, the Court could have solicited additional briefing from the FCC, to the extent
that its position was viewed as importantly distinct from that of the Department of Justice.
Such attempts to rely upon the Executive Branch would have seemed sensible, of course,
had the Court been more candid about the complex policy choices at issue, balancing
concerns with consumer protection and privacy with potentially overly expansive liability
(and this is to say nothing of the political complexities, given, in particular, the tremendous
influence of the technology sector). Rather than acknowledge this complex reality,
though, the Court opted to ignore (by name, at least) the policy reasoning of the various
political branch actors involved, pretending instead that grammatical rules and structural
reasoning left only one tenable interpretive position.
With the rule of lenity, the story is similar though slightly more complicated.
Glossed alternatively as the principle that “penal statutes must be construed strictly”176 or
that courts should “interpret ambiguous penal statutes in favor of the defendant,”177 some
textualists have commented upon the rule critically, warning against any interpretive
principle that would invite judges to deviate from a statute’s “most natural” reading. As
then-Professor Barrett explained, however, in a 2010 law review article on the relationship
between textualism and “substantive” canons, textualists nonetheless embrace the rule
of lenity so long as it is taken to apply only if a statute is truly “ambiguous.”178 In this
respect, the critical commentary just mentioned is best understood as warning against a
misinterpretation of the interpretive principle or, as Barrett puts it more candidly, an effort
to conform the rule of lenity to a more thoroughgoing commitment to faithful agency.
The justifications offered for adherence to the rule of lenity are many. Sometimes
textualists explain adherence to the rule mostly in terms of historical pedigree, observing,
for instance, that the rule is “perhaps not much less old than [statutory] construction
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itself.”179 More commonly, textualist appeal to the idea of “fair notice,” offered alternatingly
as a constitutional or a purely normative justification, with Justice Gorsuch remarking, for
example, that “much like the vagueness doctrine, [the rule of lenity] is founded on ‘the
tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals’ to fair notice of the law.” 180 And, as
relevant here, textualists consistently describe the rule of lenity as “democracypromoting,”181 drawing upon Chief Justice John Marshall’s explanation in United States
v. Wiltberger that “the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, and not in the
judicial, department.”182 Implicit in Marshall’s reasoning, of course, is that to construe a
statute as imposing criminal liability outside its unambiguous “core” would be, in effect,
for a court to create criminal law. (Hence, the occasional description of the rule of lenity
as a prohibition against federal criminal common law.183)
Setting aside offered justifications, the rule of lenity also operates as a principle of
non-intervention. Unlike administrative law settings in which agency adjudication can
sometimes establish civil liability as the legal status quo, criminal liability can only be
established through judicial enforcement. For that reason, if a court declines to hold a
defendant criminally liable on the ground that the statute invoked by the prosecution is
insufficiently “clear,” one can understand that decision, ala Easterbrook, as declaring the
situation “outside the statute’s domain.”184 The “party relying upon the statute,” after all,
has failed to show that Congress resolved the dispute in the way it alleged, and so the
court has declined to rule in its favor, leaving the legal status quo unaffected.185
Though uniform in recognizing the principle, textualists have differed and continue
to differ in their enthusiasm for it. Practically speaking, this difference manifests mostly in
the degree of “ambiguity” believed to be required for the principle to come into play. Scalia
and Garner, while emphasizing that “[n]aturally, the rule of lenity has no application when
the statute is clear,” recommend that courts construe criminal statutes favorably for
defendants when “after all the legitimate tools of interpretation have been applied, ‘a
reasonable doubt persists’” as to statutory meaning.186 This more expansive
understanding contrasts with Barrett’s, according to which the rule only serve to select
“between equally plausible interpretations of ambiguous text”187 or Kavanaugh who says
the rule “applies only in cases of ‘grievous’ ambiguity,” which is to say circumstances in
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which, “even after applying all of the traditional tools of statutory interpretation,” the Court
‘‘can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.”188
Such differences between the justices notwithstanding, it would be misleading to
suggest that the rule of lenity has played a major role in the Court’s reasoning at any point
in recent decades. Even when affirmatively invoked, the rule has typically been presented
as removing “any doubt” as to the correct reading of the statute.189 In this respect, the
rule of lenity differs meaningfully from the Chevron doctrine, which, regardless of its
influence over case outcomes, was the prevailing analytical frame for statutory cases
involving an administering agency until very recently. Be that as it may, there does appear
to be a similar if more subtle shift away from using the rule of lenity even as window
dressing or as a principle that must be acknowledged if only to be dismissed as having
no application. Illustrated more fully in cases from this Term discussed in the next Part,
textualist justices today (as well as justices adhering to a textualist methodology
strategically) appear increasingly to make a point of saying that the rule of lenity has no
application even in opinions that construe the criminal statute at issue in favor of the
defendant or to outright ignore the rule in opinions that side against the defendant. As
with Chevron, then, this deemphasizing of the rule of lenity, though, again, more subtle
and more uneven, is further indication of a textualist Court’s decreasing interest in even
the appearance of a commitment to non-intervention.
Sticking for now to the narrow discussion of canons, one can see how a refusal to
take advantage of lenity can lead to the sorting of “dueling canons” opinions Llewellyn
parodied more than 70 years ago. Returning to Lockhart, in her majority opinion,
Sotomayor ironically cited Llewellyn’s Remarks as evidence that the apparent availability
of the series-qualifier canon invoked by Kagan in her dissent was inadequate to prove the
statute ambiguous since ““[t]here are two opposing canons on almost every point.”190 And
in her dissent, Kagan made a point of emphasizing that resorting to the rule of lenity was
unnecessary since “the ordinary way all of us use language” was the real reason “why
Lockhart should win.”191 Commenting on the decision, Easterbrook lamented that this pair
of opinions suggested an “absence of method” in statutory cases.192 While “attracted to
the dissent’s approach,” Easterbrook confessed that he did not “think that either the
majority or the dissent in .. Lockhart ... can be called wrong” since, as in “most” cases
reaching the Court, the language at issue in Lockhart was “incomplete.”193 Given this
irresolvable “ambiguity,” Easterbrook continued, the only principled way to resolve a case
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like Lockhart would be by appeal to lenity or some similar rule.194 Even there, though,
Easterbrook worried that disagreements about how ambiguous a statute must be to
trigger the rule might render it insufficiently rule-like—a problem that might be resolved,
he suggested intriguingly, through the implementation of a voting rule.195

V. Beyond Canons
While the discussion above focused on interpretive canons, a more ‘wooden’ or
‘mechanical’ textualism has spread much further than that. In multiple cases, textualist
reasoning has been the subject of mockery or outright derision in popular coverage, even
in circumstances in which the outcomes reached were ones commentators otherwise
praised. As illustrated below, the reason, as with the cases involving canons above, is
that textualist judges today have no option but to exaggerate the determinacy of linguistic
meaning.
Two additional cases from this past Term capture textualism’s current position.
Both cases devote extended, dictionary-supported analysis to Congress’s selection of a
one- or two-letter word. And much worse, both offer what purports to be careful, detailed
linguistic analysis but what is, upon closer inspection, mildly elaborate obfuscation.
Start with Niz-Chavez v. Garland.196 In that case, the Supreme Court considered
what discretion the federal government enjoys in issuing “a notice to appear” in a removal
proceeding.197 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a non-citizen eligible for
removal may receive discretionary relief if, among other things, she has been
continuously present in the United States for at least ten years.198 The Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), however, provides that a noncitizen’s continuous presence “shall be deemed to end ... when the [non-citizen] is served
a notice to appear” in a removal proceeding.199 The IIRIRA, in turn, defines “notice to
appear” as “written notice … specifying” various things, including the nature of the
proceedings against the recipient, the legal authority under which those proceedings
would be conducted, and, as relevant here, their time and location.200 In Niz-Chavez, the
government ordered the removal of Agusto Niz-Chavez, sending him a document
containing his removal charges.201 Two months later, the government sent a second
document providing Niz-Chavez with the time and place of his hearing.202 An immigration
judge eventually denied Niz-Chavez's plea for relief under the INA.203 The Board of
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Immigration Appeals affirmed, concluding in part that Niz-Chavez was ineligible for
discretionary relief because the two documents sent to him by the government collectively
constituted “notice to appear” under the IIRIRA and so “stop[ped]” his continuous
presence prior to his accruing the needed ten years.204
Dividing six to three, the Supreme Court held that the Board erred in its
interpretation of the IIRIRA.205 Writing for the majority, Justice Gorsuch explained that the
IIRIRA’s requirement that the government serve “a notice to appear” was incompatible
with the Board’s conclusion that a series of documents containing the necessary
information was enough to end a non-citizen’s continuous presence.206 To the contrary,
Gorsuch continued, Congress’s use of the indefinite article indicated its intention to
require the government to issue a “single document” with all the relevant information
before continuous presence would cease.207 Pushing back against this inference, the
government and the dissenters, led by Justice Kavanaugh, observed that the IIRIRA
defined “notice to appear” as, simply, “written notice,” giving no indication such notice
“must be provided in a single document.”208 Gorsuch countered that the dissenters’
observation was irrelevant because the definition in question defined “notice to appear,”
not “a notice to appear,” and so even if one were to substitute the supposedly helpful
definition for the operative phrase, the problem posed by Congress’s use of the indefinite
article would persist.209 The dissenters argued further that even if Congress’s use of the
indefinite article was deliberate (something they seemed to impliedly question), that did
not preclude the issuing of “a” written notice in “installments.”210 Here Kavanaugh pointed
to a handful of seemingly helpful examples, including “a job application” that may be
submitted “by sending a resume first and then references as they are available.” 211
Gorsuch responded with examples of his own, observing, for instance, that “someone
who agrees to buy ‘a car’ would hardly expect to receive the chassis today, wheels next
week, and an engine to follow.”212 More generally, Gorsuch observed, “[n]ormally,
indefinite articles (like “a” or “an”) precede countable nouns,” suggesting that here
Congress intended to refer to a “countable object (‘a notice,’ ‘three notices’),” as opposed
to a “noncountable abstraction (‘sufficient notice,’ ‘proper notice’)” as the government and
the dissenters were suggesting.213
Liberal commentators were enthusiastic about the Court’s pro-immigrant outcome.
At the same time, Gorsuch’s text-bound opinion elicited mockery. Slate reporter Mark
Joseph Stern, for example, belittled Gorsuch’s reasoning as “persnickety libertarianism”
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and a “grammatical geek-out.”214 Similarly, law professor Michael Dorf called Gorsuch’s
argument “ridiculous,” complaining that the justice’s “petty sticklerism,” despite
“fortuitously benefit[ing] an undocumented immigrant,” was “still petty sticklerism.215
One sympathizes with this sort of derision. Though presented as careful linguistic
analysis, Gorsuch’s opinion mostly alternates between question-begging and
misdirection. Gorsuch’s appeal to countable nouns, for instance, is simply a non-sequitur
insofar as an example like “a job application” submitted in installments is an example of
countable nouns that can be delivered in installments. (In referencing “written notice” as
a “noncountable abstraction,” Gorsuch appears to be harkening back to the dissenters’
argument based on the definition of “notice to appear,” but that argument is wholly
separate from the observation that singular objects sometimes are delivered in parts.)
Ultimately, the best Gorsuch can muster to explain away such examples is to offer
examples of his own, explaining why his are more similar.216 Most forcefully, Gorsuch
observes that one would expect “an indictment in a criminal case or a complaint in a civil
case” to arrive in a single document.217 In response, the dissenters observe that, unlike
an indictment or a complaint, a notice to appear contains “charging information and
logistical calendaring information,” making it “easy to understand why a notice to appear
might require two installments while an indictment requires only one.”218
Implicit in the previous exchange, of course, is that whether Congress intended (or
maybe better precluded) the use of multiple documents in providing “a notice to appear”
turns less on the grammatical article that Congress selected than what practicalities
Congress did or did not have in mind. Concerning such “policy arguments,” Gorsuch
candidly observes that, in this case, “[a]s usual, there are (at least) two sides,” which is
why the Court was resting its decision on Congress’s “plain statutory command,” and not
“raw consequentialist calculation.”219 Notably, the dissenters in this regard sounded
remarkably like Gorsuch, conceding that “one may reasonably debate” which of the two
readings of the IIRIRA was better as a matter of policy, but that here, the Court’s job was
to “follow the law passed by Congress and signed by the President,” the meaning of which
was “clear” in their view.220 For all nine justices, then, the IIRIRA admits of only one
plausible reading. Such an implausible claim is forced most obviously for Gorsuch, who,
wishing to decide against the government but thus far unable to assemble five votes to
declare Chevron no longer the law, must insist that the available “textual and structural
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clues” permit the Court to “resolve the interpretive question,” thus making irrelevant any
“conflicting reading the government might advance.”221 For Kavanaugh and the other
dissenters, though, deferring to the Board’s interpretation of ambiguous statute would
seem like an attractive, less embarrassing route to the same outcome. And yet, similarly
skeptical of agency deference, the dissenters too are compelled to say that, despite the
contestable underlying policy issue, Congress’s instruction can only be read one way.
Consider next Van Buren v. United States.222 The question there was whether the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA) criminalizes the use of computer access
for an improper purpose.223 Nathan Van Buren, a police officer, had run a license-plate
search in a law enforcement database in exchange for money as the target of a sting
operation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. While Van Buren had been authorized
to access the database for law enforcement purposes, his use of the database for
personal gain plainly (and knowingly) violated departmental policy. The question in Van
Buren was whether this conduct also violated the CFAA, which imposes criminal liability
on someone who “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds
authorized access.”224 The Act in turn defines “exceeds authorized access” as “to
accesses a computer with authorization and use such access to obtain or alter information
in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”225 According to Van
Buren, the operative provision of the CFAA did not apply to his conduct because that
provision concerns only information one is not permitted to access for any reason. The
government, by contrast, argued that the provision applies to anyone who accesses
information for an unauthorized purpose, regardless of whether that person could access
the same information legitimately for some other reason.226
Six justices sided with Van Buren. Writing for the Court, Justice Barrett set aside
the “host of policy arguments” raised by Van Buren and the government, “start[ing],”
instead, “with the text of the statute.”227 Drawing on the Random House Dictionary of the
English Language and Black’s Law Dictionary, Barrett observed that Van Buren was
uncontestably “entitled” to obtain the license-plate information at issue given his position
as a police officer.228 But was he “entitled so to obtain” that information, as the CFAA
required? Appealing again to Black’s Law Dictionary and this time the Oxford English
Dictionary, Barrett reasoned that “so,” as used in the Act, “serves as a term of reference
that recalls ‘the same manner as has been stated’ or ‘the way or manner described.’” 229
And since the “only manner of obtaining information already stated” in the relevant
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provision is “via a computer [one] is authorized to access,” it follows that one only obtains
information, for CFAA purposes, one is not “entitled so to obtain” if one obtains that
information using a computer one is not “authorized to access.”230 Against this
interpretation, Barrett noted that the government read “entitled so to obtain” to refer to
“information one was not allowed to obtain in the particular manner or circumstances in
which he obtained it.”231 That “manner or circumstance,” Barrett continued, supposedly
included “any ‘specifically and explicitly’ communicated limits on one's right to access
information.”232 Despite “surface appeal,” Barrett reasoned, the government’s reading
“prove[d] to be a sleight of hand” since it had interpreted “so” to refer to a “manner or
circumstance” but had “ignore[d] the definition's further instruction that such manner or
circumstance already will ‘have been stated,’ ‘asserted,’ or ‘described.’”233 After all, on the
government’s interpretation, the “manner or circumstance” captured by “so” is “not
identified earlier in the [CFAA]” but instead could “appear[] anywhere—in the United
States Code, a state statute, a private agreement, or anywhere else.”234
Like Gorsuch’s opinion in Niz Chavez, Barrett’s extended discussion of “so” in Van
Buren also invited mockery. While here again liberal commentators were generally
praising of the Court’s non-carceral outcome, veteran Supreme Court reporter Marcia
Coyle chided Barrett and her textualist colleague Justice Thomas (more on Thomas’s
dissent below) for being unable to agree on the meaning such a simple term.235 Similarly,
law professors Leah Litman, Melissa Murray, and Kate Shaw jointly characterized
Barrett’s opinion as “fetishistically textualist,” with Murray comparing Barrett’s analysis to
then-President William Jefferson Clinton’s infamous disputation of the meaning of “is.” 236
And law professor Nicholas Bagley summarized his assessment as follows: “The outcome
is good; the analysis is daft. How many dictionaries can you cite, to so little effect?”237
Such disparaging commentary was understandable. As Justice Thomas observed
in his dissent, Barrett’s extended discussion of “so” itself proved a sleight of hand.238
Given his status as a police officer, there was, of course, a sense in which Van Buren
was “authorize[d]” to “access[]” the law enforcement database at issue. There was also,
though, a sense in which he was not since one could also hear Van Buren’s
“authoriz[ation]” as having been limited to “accessing” that database for legitimate
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purposes.239 The government noted this possible interpretation in its briefing, only for
Barrett to brush it aside as lacking “any textual basis.”240 Despite this assertion, the
government’s alternate reading showed, however, that the case turned less on the
meaning of “so” than on the nature of Van Buren’s “authoriz[ation],” which was something
appeal to dictionaries was not going to settle. To the contrary, whether Congress intended
a broad or narrow reading of “authoriz[ation]” depended on whether it meant to create
narrow or broad criminal liability for computer misconduct, which is to say it depended on
what Congress was trying to do with the statute.
And here we return to the “host of policy arguments,” the significance of which
Barrett tried to downplay at the outset.241 On Van Buren’s side was the entirely reasonable
concern that the government’s interpretation would subject employees prohibited from
using their workplace computer for personal use to criminal liability for checking their
email or reading the news. For the government, there was the nontrivial worry that a
national security official might evade liability despite misusing their access to monitor a
former spouse. Barrett understandably preferred not to rest her conclusion on such
arguments the underdeterminacy of which (in terms of Congress’s intention) almost jumps
off the page. At the same time, Barrett was conspicuously unwilling to place weight on
the rule of lenity, seemingly an easy basis upon which to reach the resolution that she
preferred but the inapplicability of which Barrett chose to highlight.242 (In dissent, Thomas
ignored the rule of lenity, reasoning instead that any ambiguity in the case could be
resolved by the presumption that Congress uses the “ordinary meaning” of a term. 243)
The reason, according to Barrett, was that Van Buren’s interpretive arguments left no
ambiguity to be resolved.244 As a result, Barrett was stuck with dictionaries and an
extended (and irrelevant) discussion of ‘so.’

VI. Conclusion
In its modern form, textualism promised to be less wooden than its earlier
manifestations through careful attention to interpretive context. By recognizing the
inherently flexible, practical nature of words, modern textualists would thus be able to
avoid the embarrassing ‘contradictions’ that saddled their predecessors. To avoid that
sort of embarrassment, though, required that textualists be more modest about the
determinacy of statutory language. To make their method of interpretation less wooden,
after all, was to make it more nuanced and, accordingly, to make it more vulnerable to
reasonable disagreement about its application in individual cases. To back away from the
‘foolish pretense’ of statutory determinacy was awkward, though, in a legal environment
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disfavoring the open exercise of judicial discretion, and all the more so for proponents of
an interpretive methodology grounded so explicitly in a commitment to democratic selfrule and opposition to juristocracy.245
To the extent that it did, modern textualism was able to incorporate a more Realist
understanding of legal determinacy because it also contained a (concededly modest)
commitment to judicial non-intervention. That commitment is, however, now mostly gone.
Seemingly motivated by a desire to accrue power to a now firmly conservative judiciary,
a combination of interpretive methodological conversions and new judicial appointments
has yielded a federal judiciary committed not only to textualism but also to deciding the
cases before them on the basis of “independent” judicial judgment.246 And because the
legal environment continues to disfavor the open exercise of judicial discretion—and
understandably so, given judges’ comparative lack of democratic legitimacy247—the result
has been increasingly wooden analysis, giving new and unfortunate relevance to
Llewellyn’s near-century old critique.
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